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PACE LAW REVIEW
Volume 27 Fall 2006 Number 1
THE PHILIP B. BLANK
MEMORIAL LECTURE
"Carpe Diem": An Opportunity to Reclaim
Lawyers' Independence
Louis A. Craco*
At the end of January, long after I had accepted the wel-
come invitation to give this lecture and had sent a synopsis of
its content to the Dean's office, Alan Abelson opened one of his
usually provocative weekend columns in Barrons with the ques-
tion, "An epidemic of integrity?" And the answer, "Something
seems to have suddenly evoked an urgent awareness of ethics,
and in the strangest of places" of which he named the halls of
Congress and Corporate America as two.'
* Louis A. Craco retired in 2003 as a Senior Partner of Wilkie, Farr & Gal-
lagher where he practiced in the areas of general business litigation, domestic and
transnational disputes, dissolutions of corporations, antitrust and trade regula-
tions and various other matters. He now serves as an arbitrator and mediator for
the American Arbitration Association, the International Chamber of Commerce
Court of Arbitration, and the Center for Public Resources. Mr. Craco is a former
President of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and currently
serves as Chair of the New York State Judicial Institute on Professionalism in the
Law.
1. Alan Abelson, Fun and Games, BARRONS, Jan. 30, 2006, at 6.
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Abelson's point is mine, too. There has ripened over the
last few years, as a result of several forces combining in a fortui-
tous way, one of those intermittent moments in American pub-
lic life when a chance to seize and hold the ethical high ground
becomes not only morally required, but actually convenient.
And in this moment, an opportunity presents itself for lawyers
to reinforce and, where necessary, reestablish-against all the
stresses that in the last decades have been imposed upon it-an
attitude of genuine independence as a central ingredient of
their conduct as well as their aspirations.
That attitude, in my view, is indispensable if lawyers, as a
group, are to realize fully what it means today to be an Ameri-
can lawyer; and indispensable, too, if lawyers individually are
to serve their clients effectively. Seizing this moment and the
opportunity it presents, is, I think, crucial to sustaining the le-
gitimate autonomy of our profession over time, and to perform-
ing well the individual and collective roles assigned to private
practitioners in the peculiarly American experiment.
Allow me to develop some of these thoughts for a few min-
utes today. First, I shall offer some observations on how the
notion of lawyer independence fits into what I believe to be the
profession's unique and critical role in American life; then I
would like to explore a bit how the long-maintained under-
standing of lawyer independence came to be under such stress;
and finally, I will suggest what it is about this moment that
creates the conditions in which we can reclaim that understand-
ing and encourage its practical application in day-to-day
practice.
As I do so, I invite you to keep in mind what the stakes of
this inquiry are. It is a crucial part of the continuing search for
a contemporary sense of purpose and worth in the modern legal
profession. And the stakes of that enterprise have been well
captured by Professor David Wilkins of Harvard, who put the
challenge thus: "One does not need to invoke much hyperbole to
put forth a credible argument that the legal profession's sur-
vival as an independent profession depends on its ability to ar-
ticulate a persuasive and public-regarding justification for its
privileged place in society."
One of the many satisfactions of the job that Chief Judge




in the Law has been the chance, and the duty, to think hard
about what it means to be an American Lawyer at the dawn of
the Twenty-first Century, to begin to formulate an answer to
David Wilkins' challenge. That has led me to appreciate, in a
way I had not before-and that lawyers in the tumult of daily
practice rarely do-how crucial the Rule of Law is to the distinc-
tive American social contract and how indispensable the daily
work of lawyers in private practice is to making the Rule of Law
a reality. I have been known to hold forth on this core notion for
hours, but let me sketch the idea for just a few minutes now,
because it is the context that gives meaning to everything else I
have to say.
The premise that The Rule of Law is central to the Ameri-
can design of things ought to be axiomatic, but it actually takes
a moment's reflection to appreciate it fully. When I speak of the
Rule of Law I am not talking about the network of positive laws
and the profusion of regulations about which reasonable people
can differ and often do. I am talking about something much
more fundamental: the necessity in our culture that people, in
general, respect and obey the law. It is a value that, like grav-
ity, we usually ignore, but that conditions everything we do and
how we do it.
Think of it a minute. The American enterprise is full of de-
liberately designed tensions. We are a nation built from scratch
on proudly proclaimed oxymorons:
We pledge allegiance to a land with "liberty and justice for
all." With this pledge, we embrace a scheme of ordered liberty
in which justice is conceived of, as Roscoe Pound put it 100
years ago, as "the ideal compromise between the activities of
each and the activities of all in a crowded world."2
We declare ourselves, both on our Great Seal and in our
daily lives, to be "E pluribus unum"-one from many. And this
in turn commits us-across all the divides of race and religion
and national origin and culture and moral perspective and eco-
nomic status and ideology and customs and manners and ambi-
tions- to making a coherent nation-one of the very few
genuine polyglot democracies in the history of the world.
2. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-




We affirm that "all persons are created equal" though in
nature and nurture they manifestly are not; only in the eye of
our law is this so.
We assert that here there is "equal opportunity for all" and
we are thus obliged to reconcile this promise with our embrace
of free-market capitalism.
There are others, creatures, for example, of our federal sys-
tem and our government of divided authority; but the point is
sufficiently made for present purposes. The one organizing
ideal that can reconcile the tensions inherent in this web of self-
competing aspirations is the Rule of Law. Lest you doubt this,
look at the headlines of your newspaper, and observe these ten-
sions on daily parade. Conflicts like the fraught issues over the
authority to detain prisoners without legal process or to inter-
cept domestic communications without warrant are classic
clashes of the claims of order and liberty. The Senate's recent
reconnaissance of the border between presidential power and
judicial authority is fundamentally about whether such vivid
clashes, and others less dramatic, will be resolved by law or pre-
rogative. You see it too in the "hot button" skirmishes of the so-
called "culture wars" like abortion, gay rights, affirmative ac-
tion and a host of others; all representing "conflicting ideas of
justice" among "diverse groups and classes and interests under-
standing each other none too well"3, to borrow again from
Pound.
The hegemony of the Rule of Law is evident from the ac-
counts of these struggles you will read, in the fact that all of
them are being fought out in the halls of legislatures and the
courts. However hard it seems to be, our society has remitted
these issues to the law for resolution.
The Rule of Law is, then, the indispensable instrument by
which we manage the tensions inherent in our grand national
experiment; by which-across all that divides us-we make the
adjustments needed to live as one; by which we create the condi-
tions in which a free economy can operate efficiently and fairly,
where private plans can be reliably laid and carried out, where





sonable approach to justice. In our world of oxymorons, the law
is both the glue and the lubricant of our society.
What the law is not, however, as Oliver Wendell Holmes
once observed, is "a brooding omnipresence in the sky."4 It is the
composite of thousands of cases and matters, laws made and
used, advice given and received, day in and day out. If the Rule
of Law is crucial to American society, it is equally true that law-
yers are crucial to the Rule of Law since they deliver it every
day in every case or transaction in which they act on a client's
behalf. It is not an exhortation, but a description, to say that
lawyers in private practice are always engaged in a public call-
ing. "They are", as my colleague in the Institute, Paul Saun-
ders, has put it, "where the rubber meets the road."
The public character of private practice is, of course, most
obvious in the courtroom, where lawyers play their socially as-
signed part by advocating their clients' rights and interests in a
public peacekeeping system dedicated to resolving conflicts
without strife and as fairly as possible.
The very fact that there is so conspicuous a public character
to this aspect of private practice, producing the clich6 that law-
yers are "officers of the court", has led to the tendency identified
by Professor Wilkins to think of the lawyer's public role as only
the advocate's role. "The larger problem," Wilkins went on to
point out while giving the Keynote Address at our Institute's
inaugural convocation in 2000, "is that most of what goes on in
our legal system takes place outside of court. Most lawyering is
transactional, advising in the office, structuring. Increasingly
what lawyers are doing is working with others to structure com-
plex economic relationships that have a deep effect on what our
political and social life is going to be like. And the lawyers who
do this work often do not see that they are connected to this
public tradition."5
But, of course, they inescapably are. Lawyers write instru-
ments that, as Mary Ann Glendon has observed, "aid citizens to
live together with a minimum of friction, make reliable plans
for the future, and avoid unnecessary disputes." This gives
them "extraordinary opportunities to affect for better or worse
4. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916).
5. David B. Wilkins, A Convocation on the Face of the Profession, 1 N.Y.S. JuD.




the quality of everyday life in our large commercial republic."
These are all public goods, I submit, delivered every day by pri-
vate lawyers in private practice papering private arrangements
for private clients. And the private ordering of their clients' af-
fairs is effective precisely because they conscript what the Su-
preme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer called "the full coercive
power of government"6 to back and enforce what they write.
And even the most private advice lawyers give, shrouded in
the privilege bestowed upon the exchange by a society that sees
a public good in enhancing the capacity of lawyers to give wise
advice, possesses an intrinsic public character. A few years ago,
at a symposium in Minnesota ambitiously entitled, "The Future
of Callings-An Interdisciplinary Summit on the Public Obliga-
tions of Professionals into the Next Millennium," Stephen
Carter of Yale offered an insight into the inherently public as-
pect of the lawyer as adviser: "The principal lawgivers in
America," he said, "are neither the courts nor legislatures, nor
administrative agencies, but rather lawyers. This," he contin-
ued, "is because most people's principal experience with under-
standing their legal obligations, and their legal rights, is
working with a lawyer. Whether it is a matter of buying a
house, defending a lawsuit, or establishing a business, the law-
yer becomes, in the life of that person, the lawgiver. It is the
lawyer who comes forward to say these are the possibilities of
what you may do or not do."' 7 So, in the daily counseling practice
of lawyers, the adjustments of interests made by the Rule of
Law are delivered by the lawyer to the client and become, for
that client, the law.
It is only because we have the fundamental role I have at-
tempted to sketch thus far that we have a legitimate claim to
independence. Independence in both senses that we lawyers
use the term: our collective autonomy from supervision by
others, and our ability to give disinterested advice to our cli-
ents. We are allowed to be independent in the first sense be-
cause it is necessary for our independence in the second sense.
Thus, we are called on by the professional self-conception I have
outlined this afternoon, to be able and willing to speak truth to
6. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
7. Stephen L. Carter, What is the Source of the Obligation of Public Service for




power, whether the power is held by the President of the United
States, or the CEO of Enron, or by a valued and valuable client.
It is truly a case of use it or lose it: our profession's claim to
collective autonomy, and the willingness of the society to allow
it, depends, over time, on our individual willingness to use that
freedom from outside interference to provide to our clients the
advice we know they need to hear, whether we think they want
to hear it or not. The whole notion of the lawyer as a public
actor delivering the Rule of Law to clients in private practice-
the account that best explains what it means today to be an
American lawyer-is forfeit if we fail to deliver the goods in the
exchanges we have with our clients.
One of the other satisfactions I have enjoyed in the Insti-
tute's work is the encouraging discovery of how often and how
well lawyers around this state and elsewhere take for granted
and act on this duty. But they and we all realize it has become
harder to act this way, and for discernable reasons.
A quarter century ago, as a friend of mine (who is not ex-
actly an ideological soul-mate) recently wrote, the Supreme
Court, "in one of its latter-day epiphanies discovered that two
centuries of prohibitions against lawyer advertising were
unconstitutional."
In Bates v. State Bar, the Supreme Court struck down as
unconstitutional Arizona's ethical ban on truthful price adver-
tising by lawyers. Justice Blackmun's opinion dismissed the
bar's argument "that price advertising will bring about commer-
cialization, which will undermine the attorney's sense of dignity
and self-worth . . . [and] tarnish the dignified public image of
the profession."8 "At its core," Blackmun wrote, "the argument
presumes that attorneys must conceal from themselves and
from their clients the real-life fact that they earn their liveli-
hood at the bar. We expect that few attorneys engage in such
self-deception."9
Well, the English bar had long done something very like
that. English barristers still wear gowns with a vestigial pouch
on the outside of their rear skirt. In bygone days, this allowed a
client to tuck his fee in, without the barrister knowing it and





dealing in tawdry trade. But in America, the lawyer's world
had forever changed.
There began first a trickle, then a flow, and finally a flood
of information about the business of law and its practitioners
that has threatened to reshape lawyers' understandings of
themselves and their calling.
The vast amount of this information spans virtually every
conceivable medium. There has grown up a whole journalistic
industry reporting in a "trade press" (both print and television)
the news, gossip and trends of the law business locally, nation-
ally and internationally. Lawyers have become media celebri-
ties, starred in their own television commercials, fastened their
images to billboards and bumpers, conducted "beauty contests,"
seminars, created brochures and homepages and found second
careers as talking heads.
The kinds of information available in this deluge are as va-
rious as the media by which they are delivered. Who is repre-
senting whom, and why, and for how much; who won, who lost,
and how; who has moved, who has stayed, who is up, who down;
where are the young lawyers going, where are they avoiding,
how do they feel; what firm, city, practice area, law school is
hot, or cold, or heating up, or cooling down; and always, always,
who makes how much money. All these data are sliced and
diced and put back together again, made into sound bites and
graphs and graphics, then turned into the "buzz" of conference
room, corridor, e-mail and bar association chatter from which
the next trendy tidbits will emerge.
Where information exists in such volume and variety, com-
parisons become possible as never before and competition inevi-
tably erupts. It is nonsense, of course, to pretend that
competition-sometimes fierce-was absent from the law prac-
tice of yesteryear. However the prevalence and openness of the
contemporary marketplace for clients and talent is something
so different in degree as to be different in kind. While long-
term, broad-scale representation of a client by a lawyer or firm
has hardly disappeared from the practice, it is no longer-as it
once was-the rule rather than the exception.
The rise of client sophistication, fed by readily available
banks of comparative knowledge, has led to the rise of transac-




rather than retained for a continuing relationship. Clients can
now discriminate more acutely about quality and price in legal
services; the fact that they can do so means, in the real world,
that they must do so. This dissolution of long-term ties between
client and lawyer puts not only the lawyer but also the client in
play. More lawyerly competition for now-available clientele en-
sues. None of this, I am convinced is solely an artifact of big-
firm, big-business practice. It is echoed in small cities and
towns across the country where it is often perceived as the loss
of the "collegiality" of the bar of former days.
Whether this is good or bad is beside the point, not so much
because the Supreme Court decided as it did, but because that
outcome, in one form or another, was inevitable. A professional
code substantially based upon keeping abundant knowledge
about law practice from the public to whose service the profes-
sion is dedicated and at whose sufferance it enjoys its monopoly
and self-regulatory authority, could simply not be sustained as
legitimate over the long term-especially not in the face of the
rise of the information age.
It has always been true that some moral courage was re-
quired to do the job of being a wise and candid counselor to a
client on whom a lawyer depended to any great extent. It has
always been true that all sorts of pressures-from partners,
family expectations, and the urge to prosper, for example-have
insinuated themselves into the mix of considerations that law-
yers weigh in deciding whether to do that job in particular in-
stances. And to be sure, the moral courage and self-respect
needed to give tough advice to a tough client has become greater
as the pressures of modem commercialism in law practice have
become more intense.
I think, however, that the time has arrived when the very
market-driven psychology that has produced those intense pres-
sures can be co-opted by skillful and dedicated lawyers to sup-
port them in their task of rendering truly independent advice.
The risks to clients of bad behavior have become so high, the
risks to lawyers of collaboration in client lawlessness have be-
come so high, the possibilities of concerted action among law-
yers within practice units and among them with the end and
aim of reinforcing professional independence and personal self-




both parties to the lawyer-client exchange should recognize the
value of giving and receiving the full benefit of a lawyer's dis-
cerning and wise judgment. To put it in a crass form I admit I
abhor, the nub of the idea is this: circumstances have conspired
to make it possible to identify such independent judgment as a
product that adds value to any transaction on which it is
brought to bear, to make it possible, also, to persuade clients
that total loyalty to them consists in providing them such ad-
vice, not suppressing it, and possible, finally, for a lawyer or
firm to achieve a competitive advantage by being recognized as
marginally better than others in consistently making that prod-
uct available to clients.
Cognitive psychologists speak of the "salience effect" by
which they mean the tendency of humans to perceive in a dis-
proportionately powerful way phenomena that stand out from
their surroundings. When advertisers try to create an appetite
in consumers for a product or brand those consumers might not
need or especially want, they routinely use salience in their ef-
forts to make their wares attract us and stick in our minds. The
whole business of endorsements by celebrities or stars of one
kind or another is built on this theory-their prominence and
supposed appeal will raise their product above the general clut-
ter of commercials and help us remember our Wheaties, or
L'Oreal, or Nike shoe.
Prosecutors instinctively know about this method too. The
"perp walk" of shame is meant not only to further humiliate its
subject but to display vividly the disgrace that can be expected
to follow crime. We speak of "making an example" of someone-
the process of elevating the punishment of a particular offender
to a degree of salience from the run of sentences, in order to
caution all the rest of us not to offend in like manner. And in
1917, beset by mutinies and desertions in the horrific trenches
around Verdun, the French Army infamously brought the idea
to a grisly nadir by summarily executing randomly selected
troops (guilty or innocent) "pour encourager les autres"-"to en-
courage the others."
Corporate America, according to Abelson's article, has been
a pacesetter in discovering honesty. "It did so, alas, under some
duress," he goes on, "in the wake of a series of scandals, involv-




executives, a number of whom have wound up enjoying ex-
tended vacations at Club Fed."10 Enron, WorldCom, Global
Crossing, Adelphia, Health South, Tyco, Marsh & McLennan,
AIG, General Re, Arthur Andersen. The somber list rolls on.
The sheer size and audacity of the corporate wrongdoing in just
the interval since the peak of the bull market in March 2000 is
astounding and riveting. And its consequences for the perpetra-
tors do stand out. Sunday's Times carried a front-page story on
the utter financial ruin-spelled out in lurid detail-of Kenneth
Lay on the heels of the collapse of Enron, with detours into the
similar fates of Bernard Ebbers at WordCom and John Rigas at
Adelphia. 11
If, as I believe, Abelson is right in seeing a revived appetite
for corporate rectitude-real and perceived-in reaction to
these and other spectacular object lessons, it is the salience ef-
fect working to good effect. Not the least of these effects, I sub-
mit, is to create a market among businessmen for good,
independent, morally discerning legal advice.
The point was made in a somewhat back-handed way in the
criticism leveled last year by John Coffee of Columbia, who sug-
gested that the failures of professional "gatekeepers" like law-
yers and accountants to do their jobs with independence and
fidelity had as much or more to do with corporate governance
failures in recent years than did compliant directors. The in-
verse may be equally if not more true: lawyers doing their jobs
with independence and fidelity to their client's authentic inter-
ests may have much to do with preventing such troubles in the
years ahead.
And, even more to my point, their clients may more fully
appreciate that this is so, and be more ready to recognize such
service as being of significant corporate and individual value to
them. If advertisers can make people buy products they don't
need by making people want them anyway, lawyers ought to be
able to sell their clients a product they do need and are, it
seems, again beginning to want.
They have every reason to try. Last year, at the annual
luncheon honoring the Life Members of the American Law In-
10. Abelson, supra note 1, at 6.
11. Alexei Barrionuevo and Kurt Eichenwald, For Ken Lay, Enron's Riches




stitute, Bevis Longstreth, formerly of Debevoise & Plimpton,
and more recently a Commissioner of the SEC, gave a scorching
speech on the topic I am rather more delicately addressing to-
day. He reminded us of the now unhappily familiar story of the
opinions rendered by key Justice Department lawyers that pro-
vided crucial, if totally unsound, support for the abuse of prison-
ers taken in the war on terror. The Bybee opinion, 12 as it has
come to be known, represented for him an abject abandonment
of the duty of lawyer independence in favor of producing a
flawed analysis that was "most plausibly explained as neces-
sary to achieve a certain result."13 And he went on to draw a
parallel to our subject today: "The issue," he said, "is one of de-
fining the lawyer's role, be it as government lawyer counseling
the President or corporate lawyer counseling the CEO."'14 In
both cases, the lawyer will be asked from time to time, "Can we
do this?" The client wants to be told "Yes" but needs to be told
"No."
If Longstreth can draw a chastening comparison between
the Bybee opinion and his perceptions of lawyer failure as seen
from his vantage point as an SEC Commissioner, some more
recent tales from Washington can offer more hopeful examples.
Bybee, it turns out, was not unopposed in his view on torture. A
profile in the current issue of The New Yorker recounts the
strenuous, continuous, thoroughly conscientious and eventually
successful efforts of Alberto Mora, General Counsel of the Navy,
first to prevent and then to reverse the "legalization" of prisoner
abuse. 15 It is a fascinating narrative of true lawyerly indepen-
dence in action.
And it must be of special satisfaction to the sponsors of this
lecture series to have learned of Deputy Attorney General
James Comey's refusal, in the face of enormous pressure, to au-
thorize continued warrantless intercepts of domestic communi-
cations under the National Security Administration's secret
12. Available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/--doj/
bybee80102memo.pdf.
13. Bevis Longstreth, 82nd Annual Meeting: 2005 Proceedings, 2005 A.L.I.
PROC.
14. Id.





program. The accounts of that episode in the New York Times 16
and Newsweek 17 are edifying, not only because Mr. Comey de-
livered this lecture a couple of years ago, but because of the sali-
ence effect his example can have.
There is, I believe, ample reason to think that the examples
afforded by Jim Comey and Alberto Mora are so distinctively
attractive that they can help to produce counterpart behavior in
the private practice of law with private clients, just as surely-I
would contend even more surely-than examples of toadying
advice in the government have had their counterpart in derelic-
tion of independence in private practice.
I base this optimistic assessment on two beliefs. First, it
seems to me apparent that practicing lawyers understand the
threat to the autonomy of the profession that would be created
by allowing an impression to become widespread that large
numbers of lawyers are shirking their duty to perform as con-
scientious and independent "lawgivers" to their clients. Lest
they are in doubt of this threat, the SEC, armed under the
Sarbanes-Oxley law with new authority to regulate the ethics of
lawyers involved in advising public companies, will clarify it for
them. Longstreth, reminding his audience last year of the expe-
rience of the accounting profession at the hands of SEC regula-
tors, said that the implications for the corporate bar of falling
short on the delivery of professional service "can be heard in the
giant sucking sound" at the SEC, "as the last vestiges of private
ordering within an already hollowed out [accounting] profession
are taken away."' 8
But it will not come to that, I think, because of the second
reason for my optimism. That lies in the fact-not the opinion,
I think, but the fact-that lawyers, despite the stresses I out-
lined earlier, are much more faithful to their duty, day in and
day out, than our critics give us credit for. That is true as a
matter of personal observation over many years of practice. It
is true from what I have learned from practitioners in the work
of the Institute. It is especially true in the smaller firms and
16. Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, Judicial Deputy Resisted Parts of Spy
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, at 1.
17. Evan Thomas and Daniel Klaidman, Full Speed Ahead; After 9/11, Bush
and Cheney Pressed for More Power-and Got It, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 2006, at 22.




among the sole practitioners who make up the greatest number
of practicing lawyers, and whose personal connection to profes-
sional values is the more acute for being less bureaucratic in the
form of their practices. The fact that this fidelity is routine,
privileged, and avoids noisy problems makes it the antithesis of
salient; but it is there all the same, and the outbreaks of honor
that the Comey and Mora stories exemplify lend such behavior
the prominence that it otherwise lacks.
The task of seizing this moment to reassert with vigor the
independence of lawyers and the autonomy of the bar does not
belong to the practicing bar alone. Longstreth proposed a joint
venture between the American Law Institute and the Business
Round Table to develop a set of best practices that would
strengthen the ability of corporate lawyers-outside lawyers
and in-house lawyers both-to provide unencumbered, indepen-
dent advice. Harvard's David Wilkens has been engaged for a
number of years in collaborative research with law firms explor-
ing the structures inside firms that reinforce the ethical per-
formance of lawyers at all levels within them. And the Institute
that I have the pleasure of chairing will shortly take up a propo-
sal to develop joint ventures with the law schools and bar as-
sociations in New York State to explore still further ways to
encourage and nurture the instincts toward independence that,
I believe, are native to the breed of lawyers. That is an en-
deavor in which we are likely to come knocking on your door.
Forgive me, please, for talking in these remarks of legal ad-
vice as a product; for talking out loud about ways and means of
selling that product. It is more, much more, than that. As I
have had occasion to insist in other venues, the qualitative rela-
tionship between the advisor/advocate on the one hand and the
client on the other is fundamentally different from the nexus
that exists between the buyer and seller of goods, and it is a
transcendently important function in the American design of
things, as I tried to convey this afternoon. But the language of
the market can, I think, at this time in our profession's history,
be useful to describe and understand the nature of the opportu-
nity before us. And, I hope, provide us with the tools to seize it.
Your invitation to give this lecture has been an honor for
me that I greatly appreciate, and I am happy to have had the
chance to explore some of these ideas with you this afternoon.
[Vol. 27:1
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss1/1
